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REPRESENTATIONS IN BELIEF AND BEHAVIOR: 
THE PROBLEM OF MEANING IN AN EMPIRICAL PSYCHOLOGY 
Peter Asaro, lionel Shapiro·, and Larry Colter', 
Department of Psychology and Department of Philosophy, IWU. 
The psychological perspectives of Behaviorism and Functionalism seek to study 
behavior and the mind through purely objective empirical methods. In the first part of this 
paper I argue that the objective, causal-physical relations of a mental state cannot strictly 
determine belief or intentional content. Thus any objective account of intentionality (i.e., 
Behaviorism or Functionalism) is incoherent. 
In the second part of this paper I explore the ways in which Functionalists have tried 
to enlist mental representation to explain belief. I utilize the arguments of Robert Cummins 
to show that any causal-physical account of mental representation will leave representational 
content indeterminant. I argue that this representational indeterminacy is a derived version 
of the intentional indeterminacy presented in the first section. I show how this 
indeterminancy has caused great difficulties for theories which try to equate mental 
representations with beliefs, and also for Artificial Intelligence which designs computational 
models of representational systems. 
In the final section I present Olmmins' account of mental representation, 
Interpretational Semantics, and how it avoids making claims about content and remains 
objective. I then examine this theory's consequences for psychological method and theory 
as well as Artificial Intelligence. 
